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ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
INCREASING psychiatric understanding of the nature of mental disease has
brought to light the vast scope of the mental health problem. Mental patients
now occupy over one half of the hospital beds in the country. In addition to
about 600,000 institutionalized cases, it is estimated that at least 8,000,000 of
our population suffer, from some sort of mental disease. Total annual cost
of mental illness, including loss in earning power, amounts to over a billion
dollars a year.' Pointing up sharply the extent of the drain on national re-
1. Bowman, Presidential Address, 103 Am. J. PSYcHIATRY 1, 5 (1946); Parran,
One Out of Ten, This Week Magazine, Nov. 17, 1946, p. 7. A valuable annual statistical
account of patients in hospitals for mental disease is: U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS.
The 8,000,000 of population and the billion dollars a year probably include psycho'
neurotics as well as psychotics. The general distinction made between these classifica-
tions of the mentally ill is that only the latter are usually fit subjects for hospitalization.
The following analysis of commitment procedures will be concerned only with the hos-
pitalization of patients afflicted with mental illness generally within the psychotic classi-
fication. Hospitalization of non-psychotic mental defectives, epileptics, alcoholics and drug
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sources by mental disease is the fact that neuropsychiatric disorder was the
largest single cause of draft rejections and the cause of forty-one percent of
all Army medical discharges. 2
The critical nature of the problem suggested by these statistics has been
recognized by the unanimous passage of the National Mental Health Act on
July 3, 1946.' This Act gives authority to the Public Health Service to ex-
tend its administration of research, grants-in-aid and fellowships to the field
of mental illness and authorizes the establishment of a National Institute of
Mental Health along the lines of the National Cancer Institute.4  It is ex-
addicts as well as commitment of mentally ill patients who have been apprehended for
criminal acts are problems beyond the scope of this Comment. In many states the com-
mitment of these various types of disordered persons is controlled by special statutory
procedures aside from the commitment statute for the insane or the mentally ill.
2. Appel, Incidence of Neuropsychiatric Disorders in the United Stales Army in
World War II, 102 Am. J. PsYcHiARY 433, 435 (1945); Rovmtree, McGill and Hell-
man, Mfental and Personality Disorders it Selective Serzqce Registrants, 1.3 A. hf. A. J.
1084 (1945); THE NATrONAL CoamE-rzn For MENTAL HYGIE:.F, MEnxcnCHn AND THE:
NEURosEs, REPORT OF THE HERSHEY CoFER Ncz ON PsYcHiATRic REHADILITATION 7-8
(1945); N. Y. Times, April 29, 1947, p. 32, col. 3. A major distinction between the two
World Wars was the greatly increased attention to neuropsychiatric disorders in World
War II. Caldwell, State Legislation in DiS.LED VETERAN, 239 Az;NALs 46, 51 (1945).
Of the 3500 psychiatrists in practice in the United States before the war, about one third
of this number served with the Armed Forces. Woodring, The Nation's Health, 1 EDIT.
REs. REP. 183, 198 (1945).
The Committee on Mental Health of the Third National Conference on Health in
Colleges reported that psychiatric consultation or care is needed by fifteen percent of all
college students, one third of whom are urgent cases. N. Y. Times, May 9, 1947, p. 44,
col. 1.
3. 60 STAT. 421, 42 U.S.C.A. § 201 (Supp. 1946). Before the passage of the National
Mental Health Act the closest Congress had come to legislating in this field was in 18
when it was inspired by Dorothea Lynde D-: to pass a 5,000,000 acre grants-in-aid bill for
the construction of mental hospitals and the treatment of the dependent insane. Only
President Franklin Pierce's veto on the ground that the bill vs an unconstitutional tres-
pass of state power aborted a premature partial assumption by the nation of a duty toward
its dependent classes. Til'FAxy, LiFE OF DOROTHEA LYiNDE DLX 166-200 (1890) ; DUtSmcu,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN A uzRcA 175-9 (1937) ; 1 Huiw, THE INSTITUTIO.NAL CAx OF
THE INSANE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 116-20 (1916).
A great private contribution to national mental health has been made by the Na-
tional Committee for Mental Hygiene, the founding of which in 1909 signified the begin-
ning of a mental hygiene movement. Largely responsible for the success of this organiza-
tion was its founder, Clifford %V. Beers. See BEERS, A MIND THAT FouND ITSERF (25th
Anniversary Ed. 1935) and DEUTScH, supra at 300-30. Another national private organiza-
tion, the National Mental Health Foundation, has recently been established mainly by
former conscientious objectors whose present work on behalf of the mentally ill was in-
spired by their wartime experience as attendants in state mental hospitals. See McGinty,
"Bedlam's" Answer, 106 Foutma 124 (1946). These national private organizations are
supplemented on the state level by privately organized mental hygiene societies in over
half of the states.
4. Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Forign Com-
inerce on H. R. 2550, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-14 (1945). For a full discussion of the
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pected, however, that only those mental patients treated by personnel con-
nected with teaching and research projects will be affected by federal ex-
penditures 5 Mental health administration is primarily a state responsibility,
and the legal procedure involved in the commitment and release of mental pa-
tients is, therefore, a subject of state legislation.
State commitment statutes, reflecting the accidents of local experience and
historical influence, are varied in the extreme." Many fail adequately to in-
tegrate the different, and frequently conflicting, considerations involved in
the commitment process-the right of an individual to be protected against
vrongful and improper commitment; the medical interest of a mentally ill
persori in being handled by the best therapeutic method; and the interest of
the community in being protected from irresponsible acts of a mentally ill
person.
THE PROBLEM OF COMMITMENT
The problems which commitment laws are designed to meet stem directly
from the nature of mental illness, as contrasted with illness of a largely or-
ganic nature.8 Organic illness does not principally affect the patient's orienta-
tion and emotional balance and is usually accompanied by discernible symp-
toms of physical disorder. On the other hand, a mentally ill person often has
no discernible physical symptoms, may not realize he is sick and may not be-
lieve his physician or his family. He may "rationally" explain his disbelief
by delusions, e.g., of persecution or grandeur, all of which may be a part of
background of the Act and an explanation of its provisions, see SEN. REP. No. 1353, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
5. Russell, The National Mental Health Act, 103 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 417 (1946).
6. Originally public care of the mentally ill was solely a town or county responsi-
bility. The 19th century witnessed state participation in providing for the men-
tally ill and in supervising local facilities, and in 1890 New York passed the first State
Care Act, making state care coterminous with public care. Craig, The New York Law
for the State Care of the Insane, 48 Am. J. INSANITY 171 (1891). To the extent that
well-defined systems of public care have been developed, most states have followed New
York; but Wisconsin and a few other states have followed the Wisconsin plan of improv-
ing mental health facilities within a framework of county care under state administrative
control. DEUTSCH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 229-71; 1 HuRD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 163-75.
Public care as contrasted to private care accounts for about ninety-eight percent of the
patients in mental hospitals. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PATIENTS IN M4ENTAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 1943 5 (1946). Considerations underlying the evolution of the public function in
this field are discussed by Brownlow, Mental Health Administration As a Function of
Government in Pub. No. 9 of the Am. Assoc. for the Adv, of Sc., MENTAL HEALT 362
(1939).
7. Digests of state commitment statutes: HARRISON, LEGISLATION ON INSANITY
(1884) ; KoREN, SUMMARIES OF LAWS RELATING TO THE COMMITMENT AND CARE OP THE.
INSANE IN THE UNITED STATES (1912); 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 618-38
(1938); Kempf, Laws Pertaining to the Admission of Patients to Mental Hospitals
Throughout the United States, Pun. HEALTH REP. SuPP. No. 157 (lst printing 1939).
1 8. Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 Tax. L, REV. 307
(1946).
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his illness.9 His lack of cooperation may be intensified by ignorant notions
about mental disease, formed before his affliction and drawn from long stand-
mng popular association of mental illness with immorality, supernaturalism,
criminality and pauperism. In the commitment process, as provided for by
state statute, therefore, a mentally ill person may have to be taken to a hospi-
tal and detained against his will by an exercise of power authorized by law.
Assuming that the basic consideration in this process is to serve the medical
welfare of the sick person, commitment would seem to be most properly
handled primarily by authorized medical personnel. Yet the other, and some-
times conflicting, considerations bound up with protecting the person from
wrongful and improper commitment and safeguarding the community's in-
terest against dangerous insane persons have generally deflected the statutory
process from serving its basic function. Thus commitment has, in fact, been
handled primarily by judges and county insanity commissions conducting
statutory proceedings similar in their nature to criminal cases.10 The allegedly
mentally ill person may be arrested by a sheriff with a warrant, charged with
insanity by a judge, detained in a jail pending the hearing, tried in open court
before a jury, remanded to jail pending a vacancy in a mental hospital, and
finally transported to the hospital by a sheriff. While this procedure in each
detail may not be followed by any jurisdiction, it represents a pattern of
existing practices which are especially objectionable.
These practices have been consistently criticized because of their anti-
therapeutic effects. 1 The patient, unable to cope with his normal surround-
ings and social relations, may become unduly excited and confused. His ill-
ness may be aggravated by delay in getting into a hospital environment, by
inadequate treatment in jail or even at home while hospitalization is still pend-
ing, and by any suggestion in the procedure that he is an accused. He and
his family also suffer from the various stigmas attached to insanity, which
maybe intensified by a judge's insanity decree,'- or worse, by a jury's insanity
9. For simple orientation to the nature of mental illness, see Tnoramn, Towmrw
MENTAL HEALTH (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 120, 1946) ; STERn, MEnTAL ILLtNSS: A
Gua FOR raTHE FAMILy (1942). For specific reference to the legal effect of various men-
tal illnesses, see Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer: The Principal Psychoses, 31 Cou.
L. Q. 327 (1946).
10. Thorman, supra note 9, at 26-7; Kempf, supra note 7, at 3. See notes 33-5 infra.
11. See, e.g., answer by the Attorney-General of Kentucky to Questionaire of the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Rights of the Mentally Ill, enclosed in
communication to the Yale Law Journal from Eldon S. Dummit, Attorney-General of
Kentucky, March 20, 1947; KAN ss LEGIsLATrvE CouNcm, PsycnUvrmc FAciunEs n
KANSAS: OBJcWrIVES OF A STATE PROGRAM 5 (1946); Myers, Connitncnt Lars it Cali-
fornia, 39 C.LI. AND WESTERN MEDICINE 313, 317 (1933) ; Blumer, The Comn:itment,
Detention, Care and Treatment of the Insane it; America, 50 Amr. J. I:;SesiT 533, 539-40
(1894).
12. See Hamilton, Kiempf, Scholz and Caswell, A Study of th Ptublc Mental Hospi-
tals of the United States 1937-1939, PuB. HEALTH REP. Sur?. No. 164 49 (1941); Vogel,
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verdict.13 Formal court proceedings to investigate a person's mental condi-
tion are, furthermore, believed to enhance public reluctance to seek psychiatric
advice at the early stages of mental illness, when possibilities of cure are
greatest.14
Introduction of less formalized commitment procedures, demanded by
therapeutic considerations, has apparently to contend with two underlying
public attitudes: (1) fear that a well person may be fraudulently "railroaded"
to a mental hospital and (2) reliance on the court as the traditionally appro-
priate public authority to deprive a person of his liberty, particularly in view
of the still imperfect state of psychiatric knowledge and facilities. While
there have been actual cases of collusion in commitment,", this fear has prob-
ably been exaggerated by the frequent use of "railroading" as a plot device in
fictional writing and by stories of patients who blame others for their com-
mitment-a natural turn of the mentally sick mind.' A limited type of
Our Inadequate Treatment of the Mentally I1, 56 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 40 1941, 1943
(1941).
13. See pp. 1192-3 infra.
14. See Earle, Prospective Provision for the Insane, 25 Am. J. INSANITY 51, 67
(1868) ; Weihofen, Commitment of Mental Patients-Proposals to Eliminate Some U1-
happy Features of Our Legal Procedure, 13 RocKy MT. L. Rzv. 99, 105 (1941).
15. The note in 145 A. L. R. 711 (1943) on actions for false imprisonment or mali-
cious prosecution predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, lunacy
proceedings contains many of the litigated cases on alleged "railroadings." The most fa-
mous "railroading" case was that of Mrs. E. P. W. Packard in 1860. For its affect on
commitment statutes, see note 61 infra. It is important to realize that she was committed
by her husband under a statutory provision unique among the commitment laws and obvi-
ously unconstitutional: "Married women and infants, who in the judgment of the medical
superintendent are evidently insane or distracted, may be received and detained in the
hospital on the request of the husband, or the woman, or parent, or guardian of the infants,
without the evidence of insanity or distraction required in other cases." (Emphasis added.)
I1l. Laws 1851, § 10, p. 96, 98.
16. See RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 613 (1871). Ray referred to an
American, an English and a French insanity authority whose experiences refuted the no-
tion of improper admissions. Psychiatrists still not only can refute it, but feel that it is
necessary to do so: "I have been in psychiatry for over thirty years ... . In all this time
I have seen only two attempts at railroading, and neither of them was successful." Bow-
man, supra note 1, at 11. "In my ten years in mental hospitals I can only think of two
patients who were improperly committed and even in them that mistake was readily ex-
cusable. . .,." Communication to the National Mental Health Foundation from Dr. Robert
A. Clark, Clinical Director of the Western State Psychiatric Institute and Clinic in Penn-
sylvania, April 23, 1947. In order to combat the opposition to a pending Wisconsin re-
vised commitment statute, Senator Buchen has found it necessary to prepare a state-
ment of seventeen points wherein the provisions of the new bill protect the patient
from railroading more effectively than the present provisions. Communication to the Yale
Law Journal from Dr. Esther H. de Weerdt, Executive Director of the Wisconsin So-
ciety for Mental Health, April 4, 1947. The seventeen points are listed in the publica-
tion of the Wisconsin Society, 10 MENTAL HEALTH Nos. 1-2 13 (1947). The full force
of public fear of railroading may be realized by a comparison between public apathy
toward the subhuman living conditions of the patients in some mental hospitals and public
[Vol. 56: 11781182
LEGAL AND MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS
"railroading" problem may frequently arise, however, in the case of a person
whose unconventional conduct may irritate, embarrass or worry the members
of his family to such an extent that they may encourage his commitment with-
out caring whether hospitalization is what he really needs. 7  Their success
depends on being able to induce the concurrence of the committing authority.
In any case a disinterested, publicly constituted committing authority, whether
it be made up of physicians or judges, or both, will minimize the dangers of
"railroading."
The relative roles played in the commitment process by expert medical
judgment and the arm of the judiciary present delicate problems. In the
great majority of cases the physician's opinion will be accepted, but in a
borderline case the judge may assume the burden of decision. The judgment
called for here is complex, involving a knowledge of the nature of the illness,
and prognosis of the benefit of hospitalization, the possibilities of cure and the
likelihood of the patient becoming suddenly dangerous. Where the determina-
tion emphasizes the advisability of treatment, it would seem to call for medical
rather than judicial authority. In a certain type of case, however, where
custodial rather than curative aspects of commitment are predominant,13
medical opinion may be deemed subordinate to the more broadly grounded
judicial opinion. For example, a garrulous hitchhiker, who has been a mild
nuisance to the community for some time, but who has evidenced no serious
psychotic tendencies and who is not considered a fit subject for therapeutic
treatment, represents a case in which the advisability of institutionalization
may depend principally on a social judgment of the community on the extent
of its toleration for his troublesome antics."' Sole reliance on medical au-
thority in the commitment process is also opposed by present inadequacies in
indignation toward the alleged illegal commitment of one man or woman. Durnsc, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 418. A psychological explanation for this public indignation is that
community guilt for its neglect and cruelty to the lunatic finds displacing mitigation in
fancying the villainy of the medical man from whom the lunatic must be protected. Com-
munication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Philip Q. Roche of Philadelphia, May 27,
1947.
17. Interview with Dr. Frederick C. Redlich, Asst. Prof. Psychiatry and Mental Hy-
giene, Yale University Medical School.
18. As psychiatrists find treatment cures for more and more types of mental illness,
their interest is to get away from any reference to the custodial function of mental hospi-
tals. Interview with Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher, Chief Medical Officer of the Supreme
Bench of Baltimore. But there are still many mental patients whose hospitalization may
be justified merely in terms of a necessary or more beneficial environment. "In the coming
years the medical profession and the public must insist that custodial care for acute cases
is no longer adequate. ... In spite of every skilled effort some mental cases will, as far
as we can now see, nevertheless become chronic.. ." RuGGLES, MENTAL HEALTir, PAsT,
PRESENT AND FuvuRE 84-5 (1934).
19. In re Perry, 137 N. J. Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885 (Ch. 1945). The opinion in Schutte
v. Schutte, 86 NV. Va. 701, 104 S. E. 108, 19 A. L. R. 711 (1920), illustrates the impor-
tance of neighborhood testimony in coming to a decision on a close case of commitment.
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numbers of -psychiatrists and other kinds of specially trained personnel, in
psychiatric training and in mental health facilities. 20  While, in the future,
cures may be found for some of the presently incurable diseases and condi-
tions in mental health services may be improved, procedural reforms in the
commitment process should be thought of in terms of existing psychiatric lim-
itations. But even where the judge may serve a useful purpose in the com-
mitment process, a formalized court proceeding as in ordinary criminal cases
woild seem to be ill-advised.
While undue emphasis on the considerations of protection against improper
commitment has occupied the center of current interest in this problem, 1
the facts of chronological development have also been important. It is only
recently that psychiatry has been able to offer any adequate empirical basis
for diagnosis, prognosis and therapy. But long before psychiatry as a sci-
ence offered any cbnception of insanity as another disease, the lav had to man-
age the consequences of mental illness as they affected the interests of the
community.22 When a person's derangement caused him to mismanage or
abandon his.property or to become a threat to his own or the public's safety,
the State intervened as sovereign protector.2 The non-dangerous insane
without property, on the other hand, merely roamed the countryside or be-
came public charges on local communities. The first public insane asylums in
the 18th century were merely extensions of local poorhouses. 24 Special statu-
tory procedures for admission were not generally enacted until the second half
of the 19th century,2 5 and the interest of the community in self-protection
20. See notes 104 and 137 in ra.
21. See Weihofen and Overholser, snpra note 8, at 340-8; pp. 1192-6 infra.
22. Zilboorg, Legal Aspects of Psychiatry in ONE HUNDRD YtAits oF AmiueAx
PSYCHIATRY 511 (1944),
23. OPDRONAUX, LUNACY LAws OF NEW YoRK 1 (1878); Smoor, THE LAW OF IX-
SANITY § 150 (1929).
24. It is important to evaluate in proper historical perspective the wholly inadequate
care afforded the mentally ill by the first insane asylums, which at that time "included all
that the mind of the public or of the medical profession conceived to be necessary." 1
Huiu, op. cit. supra note 3, at 139; Zilboorg, supra note 22, at 530.
25. Among the advocates for commitment legislation were the early psychiatrists who
urged the need for a minimum of. legal procedure to protect themselves and public officials
from damage suits. Ray, Project of a Law for Determining the Legal 'Relations of the
Insane, 7 Amr. J. INSANITY 215, 217 (1851). In the famous opinion of Van Deusen v.
Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90 (1879), the judges of the Michigan Supreme Court split two to
two on the question of the sufficiency of a hospital superintendent's defense of good faith,
and two to two on the question of the necessity for a court proceeding in a case of doubt-
ful insanity. See Responsibility of Asylum Superintendents, 36 Am. J. INSANITY 259
(1880). A provision still on the Mississippi statute books codifies the law generally ex-
isting before the early commitment legislation: A patient not adjudged insane may be
admitted upon an application by some one in his behalf, but in all such cases asylum su-
perintendents and trustees "shall act at their peril if the person be sane." Miss. Cons
§6917 (1942).
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was at that time still the predominant consideration in commitment of the
mentally ill.
HISTORICAL INFLUENCES 0N COMMITMENT
The Community Interest in Self-protection. The right to restrain an in-
sane person against his will without legal process existed at common lay.
whenever confinement was necessary to prevent personal or property dam-
age.26 It was an emergency right and could be exercised only during the
time necessary to obtain legal authority.27  In addition, when the question of
confinement did come before a judicial officer, the allegedly insane person
was considered simply as a dangerous person to be at large. He might be
put in a jail, poorhouse, pen, strong room or any secure place.2
Reflecting the initial common law doctrine, commitment in the early statutes
was limited to the dangerous insane. One of the first signs of legislative
recognition that the confinement of an insane person was an incident of his
medical treatment was an 1842 New York law providing for expeditious
transfer of the insane from the courts, poorhouses and jails to the State
Lunatic Asylum.2 9 And in 1845 Chief Justice Shaw liberalized the common
law limitation of "dangerous insanity" to include a sick mind likely to com-
mit dangerous acts, thus recognizing a curative justification for judicial re-
straint.3 0 While the sole criterion for commitment in early statutes vras
"dangerous to be at large," the New York Commissioner in Lunacy said in
1878 that "the proper test in all cases is the dangerous nature of his disease,
not the dangerous character of his demeanor alone." 3 '
The present existence of this criterion in some commitment statutes mani-
26. Christiansen v. Weston, 36 Ariz. 200, 284 Pac. 149 (1930); Bisgaard v. Duvall,
169 Iowa 711, 151 N. W. 1051 (1915); Look v. Dean, 103 Mass. 116 (1871); Keleher v.
Putnam, 60 N. H. 30 (1880); 1 CooLEY, TREATiSE ox Toirs 313-4 (3d ed. 1905). How-
ever, the person exercising this right assumes the burden of prosing the imminent neces-
sity of restraint in a suit against him for civil damages. Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305,
151 N. E. 911 (1926); Maxwvell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N. NV. 541 (1920); Boasch
v. Kick, 97 N. J. L. 92, 116 At. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Notes, 45 A. L. R. 1464 (1926) ;
10 A. L. R. 488 (1921). The necessity, therefore, is apparent for a statutory procedure
under which mentally ill persons needing immediate treatment can be summarily admitted
to mental hospitals. See pp. 1196-7 infra.
27. Colby v. Jackson, 12 N. H. 526 (1842) ; BuswE.J, THE LAW, OF INSANITY § 23
(1885) ; Smoor, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 189; 1 Huan, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331. For
codification of this common law doctrine, see Neb. Legis. Bill 74, § 83-357 (Feb. 2S, 1947);
N. D. REv. CoDE. § 25-0329 (1943) ; S. D. CoDE § 30.0102 (1939).
28. DFUTscHr, oP. cit. sutPra note 3, at 418-9.
29. N. Y. Laws 1842, c. 135, §§ 18-23.
30. Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 (Monthly) Law Reporter 122 (1845), 2 Am. J. I,.-
sAxrry 225 (1846). See also Denny v. Tyler, 85 Mass. 225 (1861).
31. ORnnoNAUx, op. cit. supra note 23, at 67. See the editorial in 39 AM. J. Ii5sAnTy
85 (1882) vividly pointing out the unpredictability of the line between the harmless and
dangerous insane and the price sane people in society must pay for the sake of preserving
the liberty of the insane.
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fests the continued association of mental hospitals with dangerous insanity
and tends to perpetuate the stigma of criminality attached to mental illness 2
It is this kind of attitude on the part of legislators toward mental illness that
is the basis of present provisions for the arrest of mentally ill persons, 3 for
their confinement in jail,3 and for their being transported to the hospital by a
sheriff.2 5 The existing criminal-like features of commitment statutes should
be unconditionally repealed. The emergency case can be adequately dealt with
by providing for expeditious commitment facilities in mental hospitals and
expeditious legal process for cases needing immediate attention.
The Community Interest in Property Aspects of Insanity. Property con-
siderations involved in handling the mentally ill, as they affect the community,
have been another historical influence tending to deflect the commitment ma-
32. E.g., ARiz. CODE § 8-301 (1939) (dangerous to be at large); GA. CODE AN.
§ 49-604 (1935) (violently insane) ; IDAHO CODE § 64-209 (1932) (endanger health, person
or property) ; WASH. REV. STAT. § 6930 (Remington, 1932) (unsafe to be at large) ; Note,
158 A. L. R. 1220 (1945) ; Smoot, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 136. See also Note, 19 A. L. R.
715 (1922) (on what proof of mental condition is needed to justify discharge from a
mental hospital).
33. E.g., N. M. STAT. § 37-202 (1941) ; ORE. Coup. LAWS § 127-206 (Supp. 1943)
Wyo. ComP. STAT. § 51-206 (1945) ; see GA. CODE ANN. § 49-612 (1935) for language
directing procedure to be carried out as in criminal cases.
34. Pending judgment: e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 105, § 34 (1935) ; IND. STAT. A~n.
§ 22-1212 (Burns, 1933). Pending hospital vacancy after judgment: e.g., Miss. CoDE
§ 6910 (1942); N. D. REv. CODE §25-0318 (1943); S. D. CODE § 30.0116 (1939); Tzx.
CIrv. STAT. §3193c (Vernon, 1939). See OHIO GEN. CODE § 1890-24 (Page, Supp. 1946)
(use of jail as approved of only by the Division of Mental Hygiene). Neither tile Na-
tional Jail Association nor the Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of Justice,
has any statistics on the use of jails and lockups, but the use is widespread, especially in
rural areas. See FoRENsic COMMITTEE OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSY-
CHIATRY, REPORT ON COMMITMENT OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS TO HOSPITALS 1
(1947).
35. A provision where only the sheriff is designated as the person to execute the com-
mitment order, eg, N. M. STAT. § 37-208 (1941), is rare, but most states provide for
execution by the sheriff and either permit a relative to go along, e.g., N. D. REV. CODE
§ 25-0313 (1943), or permit the court to designate another person than tile sheriff to
execute the order, e.g., OHIo GEN. CODE § 1890-38 (Page, 1937). In 1933 both houses
of the California Assembly passed a liberalized commitment statute, which was vetoed by
the Governor at the request of representatives of the California Sheriffs' Association, be-
cause it contained a clause removing the function of transporting mental patients to the
hospital, thus depriving the sheriffs of a liberal source of fees. Myers, supra note 11, at
317-9. While most states do provide that a female patient be accompanied by a woman
or her close relative, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., C. 91%, §6-11 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946), it
has been urged that more serious attention be given to the provision on transportation,
since the patient's impression received at that time may play an important part in his
recovery. STERN, op. cit. suPra note 9, at 39-40. The Colorado Psychopathic Hospital has
not accepted patients brought in patrol wagons. Weihofen, supra note 14, at 102. Mental
patients should be accompanied to the hospital by hospital personnel especially instructed
on how to carry out this duty in the best therapeutic manner; but less than half of the
states provide for this service by statutory requirement, e.g., N. Y. MENTAL HYC. LAW
§ 81(2), or by judicial request, e.g., LA. GEN, STAT. § 3938.23 (Dart, Supp. 1947),
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chinery from its basic function of serving the medical welfare of the sick per-
son. This influence has operated in two opposed fact situations. In the first,
indigency, the community faced the problem of making some provision for
the insane person who was not capable of providing economically for himself.
In the second, where the insane person had property, the state as parns
patriae was interested in seeing that its incompetent ward did not irrespon-
sibly squander his estate.
Pauperism in the early 19th century was a classification within which no
distinction was made for treatment purposes among the sick and invalid, the
well and able-bodied, the old and young, the feeble-minded and the insane.2,
The indigent insane were cared for as were other paupers, either in private
homes with state support or in the public poorhouse. Thus hobbled from the
very start by "that fetich of government-Economy, ' 37 insane asylums and
commitment laws had their origin.
Since at first public asylums were exclusively for the indigent, 5 the investi-
gation of the financial status of the alleged mentally ill and those legally re-
sponsible for him logically became a vital part of the early commitment pro-
ceeding, and is still included in the commitment statutes of many states. 9
Likewise a determination of the indigent's legal residence came to be included,
so that the proper local government unit would be charged for his supportM 0
While it is still necessary to determine the paving or non-paying status of the
patient,41 this would seem to be a matter of financial administration, to be
handled most efficiently by the department which manages the state's mental
36. DEUTSCH, op. cit. mupra note 3, at 114-31.
37. Id. at 131. "The time would fail us to mention the instances we have known, of
patients removed from a hospital where they were enjoying a tolerable degree of comfort,
and placed in cages or other places more or less unsuitable for the abode of any human
being, because the town could save by the change, a shilling or quarter of a dollar a
week" Ray, Legislation for thc Insane in Maine, 4 A. J. INsAN-ITY 211, 213-4 (1848).
38. A recent Connecticut report recognizing that the existing "support" statutes were
originally written on the assumption that all public patients are indigent, urges that the
rates should now be flexible and reflect the family's ability to pay. Couuinvxs, Ax'-
POINTED TO STUDY THE STATE HosPITALS, REPORT TO THE 1947 GEINrAsL AssMsLYv 9
(1946).
39. E.g., AA. CODE, tit. 45, § 212 (1940) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-2003 (Supp. 1945);
MINN. STAT. § 8975 (Mason, 1927) ; MONT. REv. CODE § 1444 (Supp. 1939).
40. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1207 (Burns, 1933); Neb. Legis. Bill 74, § 83-320
(Feb. 28, 1947) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-44 (1939) ; W. VA. Coos §2 61 (1943).
41. A statute imposing liability upon the estate or relatives of an insane person for
his support in an asylum is considered a legitimate exercise of legislative power. Note, 48
A. L. R 733 (1927). In some states paying patients are committed to state hospitals by
a different and more simple procedure than the one by which indigents are committed, e.g.,
GA. CoDz ANN. § 35-228 (1935) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 9323 (1943). The major recommenda-
tion for a legal revision in a presently proposed program for the development of Mental
Health Activities in Vermont is the equalization of commitment procedures betv.een in-
digent and paying patients. DEPARTmENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, RErO r OF THE COUMI='rr
FoR MENTAL HEALTH 8-10 (1946).
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institutions.42 These determinations unnecessarily consume the court's time at
the commitment proceeding and should not be prerequisites to medical care
and treatment.43
The origin 9f insanity proceedings to determine custody emphasized control
of the property of a mentally unsound person. The English king, assuming
the role of guardian to preserve an incompetent's estate, delegated the duty of
determining incompetency to the Chancellor,44 and in early American experi-
ence these functions were assumed by the courts.4 While the purpose of ap-
pointing a guardian or committee is to protect an incompetent person and his
estate, the transfer of legal responsibility carries with it a change in his entire
legal status, for his civil rights are suspended both as to person and as to
property.46 A commitment proceeding, on the other hand, is in its nature a
determination of the patient's medical status, and many patients in mental in-
stitutions are sufficiently competent to handle their business affairs so that
they need not be deprived of their civil rights.4 7
In the early formulation of commitment statutes there was a tendency to
confuse incompetency with commitment, and in fact the suggestion was made
42. See Overholser, The Desiderata of Central Administrative Control of State Afcn-
tal Hospitals, 96 Am. J. PsYcHIATY 517, 526-7 (1939).
43. It has been suggested that the State's position of having to prove in court at the
time of commitment whether the patient or his estate will reimburse the State for the cost
of treatment is a primary purpose of the legal requirements for admission to a mental
hospital. Kempf, supra note 7, at 2. In a few states even the transfer from paying status
to indigent status requires judicial action. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 9346-7 (Supp. 1946) ; N. 3.
ANN. § 30:4-71 (1939) ; OxLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, H 68-9 (1937).
44. See People v. Janssen, 263 Ill. App. 101, 103 (1931); Weihofen and Overholser,
supra note 8, at 307-8. The basic statute for this jurisdiction was De Prerogativa Regis,
1339,' 17 Edw. II, c. 11, which divided the mentally unsound into two classes, the idiot and
the lunatic. The former was deemed "a natural fool" whose mental incompetency was
incurable and whose property remained in royal custody until death. The latter was
deemed a "lunatick" whose guardianship terminated upon recovery. BavDALL, NON
Compos MENris (1700) ; ORDRONAUX, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3-4.
45. SMsoor, op. cit. sepra note 23, § 124.
46. SINGER AND KROHN, INSANITY AND LAW 223 (1924) ; SMoor, op. cit. suprp, note
23, § 240.
47. See FORENSIC COMMITTEE OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIArY,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 3. For the judicial criterion of incompetency, see Notes, 17
A. L. F. 1065 (1922) ; 113 A. L. R. 354 (1938). A Mississippi court has made a distinc-
tion between commitment which is in the nature of a police regulation designed for the
protection of the public and of the insane person and incompetency which is designed solely
for the purpose of protecting the estate and person of the insane. In the latter clear and
indisputable proof was said to be necessary, but in the former the protection of the com-
munity would warrant solving a doubt in favor of commitment. Baum v. Greenwald, 95
Miss. 765, 49 So. 836 (1909). Criteria for commitment and incompetency should not
now be determined by marks along a line which hypothetically ends at "absolute madness."
The law should recognize at least the principal classifications of psychoses, Coon, supra
note 9, rather than lump all mental diseases under the heading of "insanity." Whether a
mental patient is also incompetent depends upon the manifestations of his disease. See
STRN, op. cit. stpra note 9, at 37-8.
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that incompetency status be made a prerequisite to commitment48 This con-
fusion is still manifest in some states, in which a decree of commitment pres-
ently amounts to a decree of incompetency. In Tennessee, for example, com-
mitment proceedings have been held merely ancillary to an incompetency
inquisition. 9 If a determination of financial status reveals that a mentally ill
person to be committed has an estate, in many states the appointment of a
guardian is directed by a provision in the commitment statute.50 Commitment,
however, should not involve suspension of civil rights, and commitment stat-
48. See Ray, Confinement of the Insaw, 3 A3. L REV. 193, 210 (1869), refuting the
suggestion on the grounds that commitment was most often of a temporary nature, that
the deprivation of legal status would intensify the patient's misery, and the prospect of
this interdict status would discourage commitment at the early stages of sickness.
49. Bradford v. American National Bank, 25 Tenn. App. 413, 158 S. W2d 366
(1941) ; Walker v. Graves, 174 Tenn. 336, 125 S. W2d 154 (1939) ; Johnson v. Nelms.
171 Tenn. 54, 100 S. W.2d 648 (1937). The proper limitation of commitment proceedings
has been recognized, however, by the courts in other states. Although a committed person
may be deemed the ward of the court, this merely gives the court the power to inquire
into the question of preservation of his property. Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192
N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406 (1908). "Such a proceeding [commitment] has a distinct object in
view, to wit, the care and treatment of the patient and the protection of the public. It is
not designed as a substitute for an inquisition, and an order entered thereon does not
effect an adjudication of incompetency." Quarterman v. Quarterman, 179 N. Y. Misc.
759, 760 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Leggate v. Clark, Ill Mass. 308 (1873); In re Cook, 218
N. C. 384, 11 S. E2d 142 (1940). Commitment status is presumptive, but not conclusive
evidence upon an incompetency proceeding. Fleming v. BithelI, 56 Idaho 261, 52 P.2d
1099 (1935) ; State v. Bucy, 104 Mont. 416, 66 P.2d 1049 ((1937) ; Oswald v. Seidler,
135 N. J. Eq. 490, 39 A.2d 396 (Ch. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 136 N. J. Eq. 443,
42 A.2d 216 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945) ; Leick v. Pozniak, 135 N. J. Eq. 67, 37 A.2d 302
(Ch. 1944) ; see Notes, 68 A. L. . 1309 (1930) ; 7 A. L. R. 573 (1920). The Illinois Re-
vised Mental Health Act provides that all committed persons be designated either as
"mentally ill" or "in need of mental treatment." ILL. AxN. SrAT., c. 91%, §§ 1-6, 1-7
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946). The former classification carries with it a deprivation of
civil rights; the latter does not. This represents the only statutory attempt to force a
separate decision on every patient's legal status at the commitment proceeding, and the
excellence of the procedure is deflected only by the confusing use of the terms "mentally
ill" and "in need of mental treatment" to convey "incompetency" and "competency."
50. E.g., Axuz. CoDE 58-303 (Supp. 1945); COLO. STAT. Ax.., c. 105, § 9 (1935);
Ixw. STAT. AxN. § 22-1207 (Burns, 1933) ; WAsH. R-v. STAr. § 6930 (Remington, 1932).
See Heckman v. Adams, 50 Ohio St. 305, 315, 34 N. E. 155, 157 (1893).
After being discharged as cured, a mental patient must initiate restoration proceedings,
Omo Gax. CoD § 1890-63a (Page, Supp. 1946), but a certificate of competency from
the hospital superintendent should be sufficient for a court order restoring the patient's
civil rights, S. C. Coow § 6249 (1942). See State ex rel. Codding v. Eby, 223 Ind. 302,
60 N. E2d 527 (1945) (certificate of release not stipulating that the patient was restored
to mental health not sufficient); In re Pfeiffer, 10 Wash.2d 703, 118 P2d 158 (1941)
(certificate sufficient for order of accounting but not for termination of guardianship).
When a patient is discharged as cured, the legal presumption of incompetency created by
commitment is entirely removed. Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 604, 156 At. 52, 56
(1931) ; In re will of Crabtree, 200 N. C. 4, 156 S. E. 98 (1930).
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utes should clearly state that the decision should have no effect on guardian-
ship proceedings. 51
The tendency to identify commitment with incompetency proceedings has
also made for excessive formality in the former.5 2 While a procedure result-
ing in deprivation of civil rights may necessarily be attended with many legal
safeguards,5 3 as has been earlier indicated, such formality is undesirable in
the commitment process, which should be limited to a determination of
whether a mentally sick person should be hospitalized.3
4
FORMAL INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
The preceding analytical discussion of the commitment process and the fol-
lowing review of current commitment practices are limited to what may be
termed formal involuntary commitment, meaning a final order of commitment
to a mental hospital for an indefinite period of time. By contrast there are,
however, temporary commitments to serve the purposes of either emergency
detention and treatment or observational detention and treatment, and there is
a form of voluntary admission for the mentally ill person who desires hospi-
talization. These other forms of commitment, to be discussed under separate
headings, have not been enacted in all the states and represent more recent
developments in commitment legislation than formal involuntary commitment,
which is the original and basic proceeding of the commitment process.
Variety of Procedures. A review of state statutes dealing with formal in-
voluntary commitment reveals that the forms of proceeding are highly varied,
some states even having alternative methods of procedure.5 5 Two main types
51. See S. D. CODE §30.0109 (1939).
52. The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that an alleged insane has a right to a
jury trial at a commitment proceeding even though the commitment statute does not pro-
vide for this right, on the ground that the North Carolina Legislature had provided for the
right to a jury trial in a lunacy inquisition proceeding before 1796 when Tennessee be-
came a state and enacted a separate constitution. Johnson v. Nelms, 171 Tenn. 54, 100
S. W.2d 648 (1937). Failure to differentiate between lunacy proceedings and commit-
ment proceedings is evidenced in a "due process" tirade against a 1913 Ontario commit-
ment law which emphasized the medical interests of the patient. Coutts, Same Unconstitu-
tional Asylum and Insane Laws, 77 CENT. L. J. 326 (1913).
53. The alleged incompetent has a constitutional right to notice of an application for
the appointment of a guardian. Note, 23 A. L. R. 594 (1923). See SmooT, op. cit. supra,
note 23, §§ 126-9. But see Georgia R. R. Bank and Trust Co. v. Liberty National Bank
and Trust Co., 180 Ga. 4, 177 S. E. 803 (1934).
54. For an intelligent opinion distinguishing between competency, an in ren proceed-
ing fixing the status of a person, and commitment, a proceeding to justify the hospitaliza-
tion of a person, see Leggate v. Clark, 111 Mass. 308, 310 (1873). See also In re Dowdell,
169 Mass. 387, 388-9, 47 N. E. 1033-4 (1897).
55. For the form of proceeding used in each state, see the chart in Appendix, p. 1209
infra. The American Psychiatric Association has advocated statutory uniformity. 102
Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 266-7 (1945). The American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Mental Health Foundation have formulated model commitment statutes and the American
Bar Association has expressed an interest in working with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. With the Federal Government playing a more
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of judicial machinery are used-first, that in which the judge acts alone in
making the final decision on commitment, and second, that in which the final
decision is made by a local commission of which the judge or the clerk of the
court is a member. In every state the proceeding is set in motion by an ap-
plication from a relative, friend or reputable resident of the community in
which an alleged mentally ill person residesY0
The most common procedure is a judicial hearing with the judge making
the final decision after an examination report by two physicians, whose quali-
fications satisfy statutory requirements.P7 This is the exclusive method of
formal involuntary commitment in 18 states and an alternative method in five
states.5 s Instead of the two physicians in a few states, the judge appoints a
three man commission, usually including a physician and a lawyer, which
makes an examination report to him. On the other hand, the final committing
authority in six states is a standing commission, of which the judge or the
clerk of court is a member.5 9
In contrast to proceedings in which judicial and lay officials play important
roles is a method used in Maryland, Louisiana, Rhode Island and Vermont,
where the formal involuntary commitment order is issued solely by the certi-
fication of two physicians. Here judicial machinery is called into play only
when an aggrieved party appeals directly from the certificate, as in Vermont,
or by a special provision for subsequent review of the mental condition of a
person already committed, as in the other three states. In Pennsylvania and
New Hampshire, moreover, medical certification merely requires notarization
by a public officer stipulated in the statute.cO
active role in the field of mental health, the U. S. Public Health Service would likely
welcome uniform commitment practices in the states. See communication to the Yale
Law Journal from Dr. R. H. Felix, Medical Director, Chief, Mental Hygiene Division,
U. S. Public Health Service, April 30, 1947. But in view of the close connection betveen
commitment and the state police power, the intrastate nature of the commitment process,
and the vastly different standards of care among the states, a uniform commitment law is
improbable in the near future.
56. Florida's requiring the application to be made by five reputable citizens, not more
than one of whom is related to the person, Kempf, supra note 7, at 17, was evidently un-
duly restrictive and was amended to allow the application to be made by a next of kin, a
sheriff, or three reputable citizens, FLA. STAT. A;xx. § 39420(2) (Supp. 1946), which is
still more restrictive than the average requirement. New York specifically recognizes an
officer of a known charitable organization and a public welfare officer among those eligible
to make the application. N. Y. MENTAL HYG. L.%w § 74(2).
57. The final authority to which the two physicians report in North Carolina is the
clerk of the court; in Maine, a board of municipal officers; and in Delaware, the Board
of Trustees of the State Hospital.
58. In eight states the procedure is the same except that an examination report is re-
quired from only one physician. See the Appendix, p. 1209 infra.
59. In North Dakota and South Dakota the standing commission is composed of the
judge, a physician and a lawyer; in Iowa and Nebraska, the clerk, a physician and a law-
yer; in West Virginia, the judge, the prosecuting attorney and the clerk; and in Vir-
ginia, the judge appoints two physicians with whom he joins on the commission.
60. For early approval of limiting the judicial function to notarization, see Smith,
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Legal Safeguards. Exemplifying the undue balance in formal involuntary
commitment on the side of legal safeguards to the detriment of medical con-
siderations are such dev;ices as the jury, compulsory personal notice and compul-
sory presence at the hearing. The legal safeguard most exemplary of exces-
sive legalism in the commitment process is the jury. Compulsory jury trial
enjoyed a spell of popularity following the crusade in the 1860's of Mrs. E. P.
W. Packard, a commitment victim of her husband's conspiracy."' It was im-
mediately criticized as being "totally unsuitable ds a means of obtaining cor-
rect results in regard to questions purely scientific."0 2 Only Mississippi 3 and
Texas0 4 now provide that a jury trial is mandatory; twenty-one states provide
that it may be used on demand, usually by an allegedly mentally ill person or
some one. in his behalf. 5 The mentally ill person who has ideas of persecu-
Unification of the Laws of the States Relating to the Commitment of the Insane, 49 Am.
J. IN sANITY 157, 181-2 (1892). Two state hospital superintendents in Pennsylvania highly
recommend this procedure. Communications to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Arthur
P. Noyes, Superintendent of the Norristown State Hospital, April 10, 1947; and from Dr.
H. K. Petry, Superintendent of the Harrisburg State Hospital, April 21, 1947.
61. Mrs. Packard had publicly differed on religious ideas with her husband, a Calvinist
preacher, who disposed of the disturbing influence by committing her, see note 15 supra.
Upon her release she became the "deliverer of the oppressed" throughout the land. In Illi-
nois she obtained the right to a jury trial for every patient already committed. In Massa-
chusetts she caused a bill to be passed, that no person was to be regarded or treated as an
insane person simply for the expression of opinions, no matter how absurd they might ap-
pear. In Connecticut she tried to have property rights equalized between husband and
wife. In Iowa and Maine she was responsible for the establishment of visiting committees
with female representation to inspect insane asylums. In Washington, D. C. she tried to
have Congress pass special legislation to protect the postal rights of mental patients. She
published a seven volume opus on "Modern Persecution, or Insane Asylums Unveiled,"
and was said to have been herself on both sides of the "borderline" between sanity and
insanity. Dewey, The Jury Law for Commitment of the Insane in Illinois (1867-1893),
and Mrs. E. P. W. Packard, Its Author, 69 Am. J. INSANITY 571 (1913).
62. Ray, supra note 48, at 212. See Lunacy Law i Illinois, 47 Am. J. INSANITY 584
(1891). In 1893 Illinois modified the law so that a jury trial was available to the court
or on demand by the alleged insane or some one on his behalf. Ill. Laws 1893, p. 140,
§§ 5-7. For a criticism of the Illinois law after this modification, see Note, 6 J. CanI. L.
& Carmixo.oGY 764 (1916).
63. The number of jurors has been reduced from six to three. Miss. Laws 1940, c.
231, § 4576.
64. A 1913 statute setting up a commission to investigate and determine the question
of commitment was held invalid as against the state constitutional provision that "the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" on the ground that there had been a jury trial in
the commitment statute at the date of the adoption of the constitution. Loving v. Hazel-
wood, 184 S. W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S. W.
508 (1917), In 1935 the constitution was amended, so that tlhe Legislature could enact a
temporary commitment proceeding without the use of a jury. TX. Co xsT. Art. I, § 15.
See Tax. Civ. STAT. § 31930-2(1) (Vernon, Supp. 1946) and Ex parte Giannatti, 189
S. W2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). There is generally, however, no constitutional right
to a jury trial in a commitment proceeding, Note, 91 A. L. R. 88 (1934).
65. See Appendix, p. 1209 infra. This number includes Tennessee where the right
of jury trial has been read into the commitment statute, see note 52 supra, and Califor-
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tion is more likely than others to demand a jury trial, and the experience of
being confronted with forensic argument invariably tends to aggravate his
illness rather than prepare him for acceptance of hospital care.0 The use of
the jury, moreover, shifts the function of weighing the evidence and reporting
to the judge from the medical experts to a group of laymen, and it represents
the opposite extreme from a formal involuntary commitment proceeding
dominated exclusively by medical authorities. Abolition of the right to a jury
trial, therefore, has been urged by both medical and legal authorities."7
As with jury trial, the right of an alleged mentally ill to personal notice and
personal appearance at the hearing are objectionable as excessively legalistic
and detrimental to his best medical interests. Service of personal notice of
pending commitment proceedings may provoke violent acts or escape; con-
frontation by witnesses may aggravate an affliction. But the rights of an al-
legedly mentally ill person to receive notice and to be present at the hearing are
sometimes considered in the nature of substantive rights guaranteed by due
process of law.6 In some states, service of notice by a warrant for arrest and
presentation by a sheriff of an allegedly mentally ill person before the judge are
standard statutory methods of procedure59 Almost all the states require per-
nia, Maryland, Montana and Vermont where the jury trial is used after an appeal by the
committed patient or some one in his behalf. Where the jury is used, medical emnination
reports are still made to the court except in three states, Delaware, Illinois and Wyoming
where the statute makes the jury an alternative to the two physicians. In Illinois, however,
one of the six jurors must be a physician.
66. See pp. 3-4 of Comment by the Joint Interim Committee on Public Welfare Laws
on Bill No. 19, S., a revision of Wisconsin's statutes relating to all types of mental pa-
tients, introduced in the State Senate, Jan. 16, 1947. The most controversial point of this
pending revision is the elimination of the optional jury trial. See note 16 su, ra. In an
Oregon case the trial judge called an advisory jury "in the spirit of fairness" to an
alleged paranoiac, whose ultimate commitment by the appellate court was abetted by a
brief written by him and charging that all the witnesses at the trial were in a conspiracy
to persecute him. In re Fehl, 159 Ore. 545 81 P.2d 130 (1938).
67. "[Jury trial] is about as sensible as calling in the neighbors to diagnose meningitis
or scarlet fever . . ." Srr, op. cit. supra note 9, at 37; Weihofen, supra note 14, at
109; INTERNATIONAL COMMxITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE, Report of Committee on Legal
Measures and Laws in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONGnSS ON- M.-
TAL HYGIENE 61 (1932).
68. See ILLIIOIs LEISLATIVE CouNCIr, PuB. No. 52, CoMMrraxiNe To Um-rA. Hos-
PITALs 12 (1942) and cases cited note 70 infra,
69. E.g., IDA11o CoDE § 64-201 (1932); KAN. GE. STAT. § 59-2003 (Supp. 1945);
Miss. CODE § 6909 (1942) ; N. M. STAT. § 37-202 (1941). State ex rcl. Pollard v. Brasher,
200 Mo. App. 117, 201 S. W. 1150 (1918). "Not long ago in California a wife decided
that her husband was mentally sick. He was depressed and had delusions that persons
were trying to kill him. Following the regular legal procedure she swore out a warrant,
the sheriff arrested the patient, and he was taken to the county jail, there to await a hear-
ing before the judge. That night he hanged himself in the jail. To those sticklers for legal
procedure and defense of the legal rights of the patient, I would point out that his legal
rights were well preserved. He was arrested on a warrant by a sheriff; he was not sent
to a hospital without due process of law and a chance to appear before the judge. Per-
haps if he had, he might be alive today. The point I wish to make is that the public is so
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sonal notice70 and about half of the states require presence at the hearing.7 1
However, it has been held that absence of an allegedly mentally ill person does
not violate due process of law when it would be injurious to hear the case in
his presence, providing others are given an opportunity to represent him."2 In
line with this reasoning many states allow the judge to use his discretion or to
follow the advice of the certifying physicians in excusing the presence of an
allegedly mentally ill person.73 Similarly, several states allow dispensing with
obsessed with the legal poipt of view and the alleged infallibility of legal procedure that
they insist on protecting the so-called legal rights of the patient without thinking of what
his medical rights are." Bowman sitpra note 1, at 12.
70. Statutes not providing for notice have been held invalid: In the Matter of Lam-
bert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901); Hunt v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158, 67 S. W. 206
(1902) ; People ex rel. Sullivan v. Wendel, 68 N. Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (Court
implied due process defect might be cured by providing for notice to some one on behalf
of allegedly mentally ill person). Cf. State ex rel. Blaisdel v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57
N. W. 794 (1893); SmooT, op. cit. supra, note 23, § 157. While not invalidating the
statute, other courts have strictly construed the notice provision: Hultquist v. People, 77
Colo. 310, 236 Pac. 995 (1925) ; Ex' parte Trant, 175 S. W.2d 161 (Kan. City Ct. App.
1943); Ex parte McLaughlin, 105 S. W.2d 1020 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1937); Clark v.
Matthews, 5 S. W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). On the ground that statutory proceed-
ings must be strictly complied with, the Michigan courts have recently overemphasized
due process to the detriment of medical welfare. Ex parle Sawyer, 311 Mich. 602, 19
N. W.2d 113 (1945) ; In re Roberts, 310 Mich. 560, 17 N. W.2d 752 (1945) ; Freedman v.
Freedman, 303 Mich. 647, 6 N. W.2d 924 (1942) ; In re Ryan, 291 Mich. 673, 289 N. W.
291 (1939) ; In re Davis, 277 Mich. 89, 268 N. W. 822 (1936). It does not appear in any
of these cases that the court was in doubt as to the patient's having a mental disease. In
the Ryan case, moreover, the patient was admittedly a sex violator, but proof of his condi-
tion by an official of the Department of Welfare was disallowed on the ground that the
expert witness' relationship to the party was too distant, the court citing as authority
BUSWELL, THE LAW OF INSANITY §241 (1885). Compare the following cases where ir-
regularities in commitment procedure did not void the action since the patient was found
to be insane. Barbee v. Kolb, 207 Ark. 227, 179 S. W.2d 701 (1944) ; Darst v. Forney,
199 Ind. 625, 159 N. E. 689 (1928); Roney v. Rodgers, 190 Ind. 368, 130 N. E. 403
(1921); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Olda. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912) ; In re Allen, 82 Vt, 365,
73 Atl. 1078 (1909).
71. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 91Y2, § 6-3 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946); Oar, Co~m.
LAWS § 127-206 (Supp. 1943) ; S. C. CODE § 6229 (1942) ; WAsH. REv. STAT. § 6930
(Remington, 1932).
72. Chavannes v. Priestley, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N. W. 766 (1890). Presence not re-
quired: Paul v. Longino, 197 Ga. 110, 28 S. E.2d 286 (1943) (when alleged insane ex-
amined by commission) ; In re Mast, 217 Ind. 28, 25 N. E.2d 1003 (1940) (when attorney
appeared on behalf of alleged insane); Ex Parte Higgins v. Horton 332 Mo. 1022, 62
S. W.2d 410, 91 A. L. R. 74 (1933) and McMahon v. Mead, 30 S. D. 515, 139 N. W. 122
(1912) (when due notice given alleged insane). See INMRATioNAL Co M~r M FOR
MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 67. But see Ex parle Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279
(1908Y and Hughes v. Blanton, 120 Fla. 446, 162 So. 914 (1935) (Provision in statute
requiring personal presence of alleged insane is sufficient notice to him to fulfill constitu.
tional due process requirements).
73. E.g., K_.&. GEN. STAT. §59-2272 (Supp. 1945) (only when presence manifestly
improper); KEN. Ray. STAT. § 202.130 (1946) (when physicians certify presence as un-
safe or unwise) ; MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 123, § 51 (1942) and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1731
(1930) (judge shall see patient or state why not) ; UTAH CODE § 85-7-20 (1943).
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personal notice upon medical certification of its injuriousness." No deprivation
of due process in any of these discretionary procedures would seem to result
so long as some one on behalf of an allegedly mentally ill person is notified and
given a chance to appear.73
While permitting judicial discretion in the use of personal notice and
presence at the hearing tends to restore the balance between medical and legal
considerations in the typical formal involuntary commitment proceeding, an
alternative and more extreme approach is found in Maryland.7- Here two
qualified physicians certify the commitment of a mentally ill person, and he is
forthwith committed. At any time after his hospitalization he or any one on
his behalf may request in writing to the superintendent that he be discharged.
If the superintendent believes the patient requires further detention, he must
forthwith file a petition for court review of the patient's mental condition.77
The Maryland statute could be improved by providing e.xpressly for the pa-
tient's right to appear unless the superintendent certifies that his health would
thereby be injured, and for the superintendent's assisting him in communica-
tion with counsel and friends.78
This procedure has been held to constitute due process, since the right to
demand a determination of a patient's mental condition at any reasonable time
subsequent to commitment supplies the required minimum of legal safe-
74. CAz. NVT. & INsTr. COD § 5050.7 (1944); M CH. STAT. Ae.., c. 127, § 14.811
(Supp. 1946); Nev. Laws 1947, c. 257, §9; N. Y. MfE.N;TAL HYG. LAW §74(3); Onio
GEN. CoDE. § 1890-25 (Page, Supp. 1946) ; O i-A. STAT. ANiz., tit. 35, § 62 (Supp. 1946);
WXis. STAT. § 51.02(1) (1945).
75. Chavannes v. Priestley, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N. W. 766 (190) and other cases cited
note 79 infra. In reality it is a deprivation of due process to harm a person by application
of a safeguard which is traditionally intended to benefit the person. See Fnau:jn, Tn
PoLicE Pouwa §254 (1904). Provision for discretionary notice, however, in a 1941
Illinois amendment caused the Attorney General to recommend a veto, which was acted
upon by the Governor. For criticism of this action, see ILL.nois LwisLATivn Com-u :u,
op. cit. suPra note 68, at 35 and Comment, Veto of the Illinois Mental Health Bill, 36 I.
L. REv. 747 (1942).
76. Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 1944, c. 14. See also R. I. GE:.. LAws, c. 71, § I1 (1933)
(two physicians); LA. GE . STAT. § 3938.12 (Dart, Supp. 1947) (coroner's commitment,
coroner and another physician); VT. PUB. LAWS § 4034 (1933) (two physicians; but
should the committed person appeal from the medical certification, he cannot be held at
the hospital, Id., § 4042, as amended, see note 80 infra; and the indigent insane are com-
mitted initially through a court procedure, Id., § 3982, see note 41 supra). In Maine,
Legis. Doc. No. 539 (1947), was a proposal to eliminate the hearing before municipal
officers, M .REV. STAT., c. 23, § 105 (1944), and to substitute commitment by t,%o physi-
cians with a right to court appeal Within thirty days. It was defeated by a vote of 98-ZO.
Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Francis H. Sleeper, Superintendent of
the Augusta State Hospital, April 23, 1947.
77. In recommending such a procedure, Kempf, supra note 7, at 11-2, Would seem to
be incorrect in calling it a temporary commitment, for the period is indefinite. It has been
called a "non-protested admission on medical certificate," ILumois LEGisLtA.Am Cou:-ciL,
op. cit. supra note 68, at 26-7, 30-1.
78. See N. J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-41 (1939).
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guards.7 9 The right may be exercised by an appeal80 or a special statutory
proceeding to investigate the present mental status of the patient.81 The spe-
cial proceeding may take the form of an "enlarged" habeas corpus hearing
which includes not only a jurisdictional review, but also a determination of the
patient's present mental status.82 The summariness of the initial medical com-
mitment in this procedure would seem to be justified under a public policy
favoring both the medical welfare of mentally ill persons and the public re-
sponsibility of the medical profession.
8 3
EMERGENCY COMMITMENT
In direct contrast to the excessively legalistic attributes of f6rmal involun-
tary commitment, a summary statutory proceeding without resort to the judi-
ciary has been devised for the temporary commitment of mentally ill persons
needing immediate hospitalization. Primarily important for the self-protec-
tion of the community and the mentally ill person himself, emergency com-
mitment does not depend on a close question of the advisability of confine-
ment and treatment, but on the existence of a clear emergency evidenced by
the actions of a person dangerously mentally ill.8 It is proper, therefore, that
79. Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W. D. Pa. 1915) ; Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark,
614, 80 S. W2d 76 (1935) ; Chavannes v. Priestley, 80 Iowa 316, 45 N. W. 766 (1890) ;
In re Dowdell, 169 lass. 387, 47 N. E. 1033 (1897) ; In re Crosswell, 28 R. I. 137, 66 Atl,
55 (1907) ; cf. Er parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912) ; see Barry v. Hall,
98 F.2d 222, 225 (App. D. C. 1938).
80. It was implicit in a Vermont Supreme Court holding that in order for an appeal
from medical certification to constitute due process the right of appeal must be without a
time limit. In re Cornell, 111 Vt. 454, 18 A.2d 151 (1941), and see In re Cornell, 111 Vt.
525, 18 A.2d 304.(1941). A month later the Vermont Legislature amended the appeal
provision so that the right may be exercised "at any time after such certificate is made or
while such person is confined by virtue of said certificate.. . ." Vt. Acts 1941, No. 62, p.
74, as amended by Vt. Acts 1945, No. 56, p. 87. Several states having judicial commit-
ment permit appeal, e.g., CoxrH. GEN. STAT. § 1755 (1930) ; MINN. STAT. § 8981 (Mason,
1927) ; Iow.A CODe § 229.17 (1946).
81. In Rhode Island commitment by two physicians was held unconstitutional so long
as the only opportunity to contest it was not available to the committed person himself, Its
re Doyle, 16 R. I. 537, 18 Atl. 159 (1889) ; but amendments cured this defect, In re Cross-
well, 28 R. I. 137, 66 Atl. 55 (1907). This requirement is satisfied in the Louisiana coro
ner's commitment, LA. GEN. STAT. § 3938.12 (Dart, Supp. 1947). Many other states hav-
ing judicial commitment also provide such a special judicial review: e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.,
c. 91'/, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946) ; OxLA. Ray. STAT., tit. 35, § 80 (1937) ; UTAu
CODE § 85-7-30 (1943) ; Wrs. STAT. g 51.11 (1945).
82. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-1223 (Bums, 1933) ; N. M. STAT. § 37-219 (1941);
N. D. Ray. CoDE § 25-0328 (1943) ; S. D. CoDE § 30.0111 (1939).
83. See KANSAS LEGisLATmv COUNCIL, op. cit. suipra note 11, at 6 and ILL 01s
LEGISLATrvE COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 68, at 19-20.
84. In Connecticut in spite of the fact that the emergency commitment for thirty days
on the certificate of one physician is limited to patients "clearly and violently mentally
ill," the emergency certificate is used for over eighty percent of all admissions. Coumrr-
TEE APPoINTED To STuDY STATE HosPITALs, op. cit. supra note 38, at 4. This means that
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medical certification as to the emergency be sufficient to commit the person for
a temporary period of time.85
Despite the apparent need for an emergency procedure to avoid detention
of a violent mental patient in jail, only twenty-two states now have statutes
providing for commitment upon an application and medical certification of an
emergency."6 The maximum period of confinement specified in the statutes
varies from two to thirty days, during which time the patient must remain at
the hospital unless discharged. 7 At the end of the statutory period the patient
must be discharged or his status changed by a voluntary admission, or a
formal involuntary commitment initiated by the superintendent or applicant.83
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN COLUITM'ENT
In recent years legislatures throughout the country have been occupied with
the subject of commitment. From 1939 to 1946 eight states revised their com-
mitment laws8" and thirteen states enacted substantial additionspo In the first
half of 1947 revision of commitment provisions has been enacted in Ne-
braska,91 Nevada9 2 and West Virginia9 3 and defeated in Maine.1 Proposed
there has been a general violation of the law in certifying emergency patients where no
manifestation of violence existed, but the amendment passed by the 1947 General Assem-
bly, which substitutes the criterion "any person in need of care and treatment," H. B. 33
(May 26, 1947), is so broad as to eliminate any emergency element in the commitment.
The result would be a temporary commitment on medical authority alone. See note 99
infra.
85. Although the statutes are divided on the requirement of one or two qualified
physicians, in view of the need for speedy action and to prevent any possibility of a
violent person's detentipn in a jail rather than in a mental hospital, the requirement of
one physician would seem preferable. Several states permit this power to be exercised
by a local health officer which would appear to be especially e.xpeditious where poor per-
sons and vagrants are concerned, e.g., Yr. RFV. STAT. § 203.030 (1946) ; N. Y. IMfE.ITA.L
HvG. LAW § 72; Wyo. Comp. STAT. § 51-403 (1945).
86. See the chart in Appendix, p. 1209 infra.
87. In Arkansas a patient with acute psychosis may be admitted on the certifica-
tion of one physician for as long as necessary; the patient has a right to demand a hear-
ing, but only upon thirty days notice. Ark. Acts 1943, No. 241, p. 498, §§ 4, 8.
88. A seemingly unfair burden is put upon the applicant by at least two states
where, if the patient needs continued hospitalization, the applicant must initiate the for-
mal commitment proceeding or pay a fifty dollar fine, S. C. CoD- § 6227 (1942); T-x.
Civ. STAT. § 3193f (Vernon, 1939).
89. Ark. Acts 1943, No. 241, p. 493; Del. Laws 1939, c. 134 and 1945, c. 219; Fla.
Laws 1945, c. 23157; Ill. Laws 1945, p. 1007; La. Acts 1944, No. 303, p. 898; N. Y. Laws
1946, c. 765-9; N. C. Laws 1945, c. 952; Ohio Laws 1941, p. 616 and 1945, p. 423.
90. Ariz. Laws 1941, c. 44; Idaho Laws 1939, c. 151; Kan. Laws 1945, c. 236; Ken.
Laws 1944, c. 29; Aid. Laws Spec. Sess. 1944, c. 14; Miss. Laws 1944, c, 279; Mont.
Laws 1943, c. 157; N. M. Laws 1939, c. 43; Ore. Laws 1941, c. 396-7; Tenn. Laws 1941,
c. 57 and 1943, c. 69; Tex. Laws 1943, c. 152; Va. Laws 1944, c. 55; Wyo. Laws 1941,
c. 44.
91. Neb. Legis. Bill 74 (Feb. 28, 1947).
92. Nev. Laws 1947, c. 257 (March 31, 1947).
93. West Va. H. B. No. 47 (Feb. 10, 1947) and H. B. No. 117 (March 5, 1947).
94. Mie. Legis. Doe. No. 539 (1947).
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changes are still being considered in Minnesota,95 Oklahoma, 0 Vermont" and
Wisconsin."8
Temporary Observational Commitment. While the general trend in this
legislation has definitely been toward a better integration of the various con-
siderations involved in the commitment process, the most noteworthy change
is the adoption of a temporary observational commitment for a period stipu-
lated by statute-a device designed to provide diagnostic screening of men-
tally ill persons. In most of the twenty-five states having temporary observa-
tional commitment procedures, the proceeding is exactly like the judicial
formal involuntary commitment, 99 except that the judge's decree specifies a
limited rather than an indefinite period of time, varying from ten to ninety
days. Because the temporary nature of this type of commitment averts the
stigma of a final insanity decree and postpones the prospects of a long indefi-
nite confinement, cooperation both by the patient and his family tends to be
augmented, thus facilitating early diagnosis and treatment. Consequently,
under temporary observational commitment a large percentage of mental pa-
tients can be sufficiently improved to justify their release within one to three
months 0 0
Where an early discharge is foreseeable, even though it cannot be effected
during the limited period of temporary commitment, it should be possible to
avoid a formal involtintary commitment proceeding. Four states provide for
this contingency by permitting the superintendent to apply for a renewal of
the statutory period.'01 In any event, at the expiration of the temporary com-
mitment the patient's affliction will have been fully diagnosed by the hospital
medical staff whose recommendations then represent a maximum of medical
95. Minn. H. F. No. 839 (1947).
96. Okla. S. B. No. 122 (1947).
97. VT. PuB. LAws (Proposed Revision), tit. 30, c. 272 (1947).
98. Wis. Bill No. 19, S. (1947).
99. See the chart in Appendix, p. 1209 infra. In only four states temporary ob-
servational commitment is by medical authority, and in each the authority is one physi-
cian or health officer. Del. Laws 1939, c. 134, § 7; Mo. REV. STAT. § 9357 (1943) (indi-
gent patients only); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, § 45 (Purdon, Supp. 1946); Wyo. CoMp.
STAT. § 51-404 (1945). Included among these temporary commitment statutes are sev-
eral that are not designated specifically for observation and/or treatment, but may be
used for that purpose by the committing authority. MIcH. STAT. ANN., c. 127, § 14.811
(Supp. 1946) and OXLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 62 (Supp. 1946) (when the court finds it
necessary and essential); N. J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-37 (1939) (immediate restraint);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, § 45 (Purdon, Supp. 1946) (immediate temporary care) ; AnIz.
CoDE § 8-207 (Supp. 1945) and S. D. CODE § 30.0108 (1939) (committing authority in
doubt). In Maine temporary observational commitment is to private hospitals only, ME.
REv. STAT., c 23, § 147 (1944); and in Washington to detention wards of county hos-
pitals only, WASH. REv. STAT. § 6931 (Remington, 1932).
100. Rickles, Commitment Bill, 5 MENTAL HEALTH TODAY No. 5 (Pub. by the Wash.
Society for Mental Hygiene) 1, 5 (1946).,
101. Del. Laws 1939, c. 134, § 7; Mont. Laws 1943, c. 157, § 3; N. C. Grn. STAT.
§ 122-46.1 (Supp. 1945); TENN. CoDE § 4459.1 (Williams, Supp. 1946).
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reliability. The final adjudication usually takes place upon the certification of
the superintendent to the judge that the patient's condition warrants continued
hospitalization. If this adjudication is contested, an informal hearing at the
hospital provides a simple solution. 10 2 In Delaware, New York, North Caro-
lina and Tennessee temporary admission is a prerequisite to formal involun-
tary commitment of all patients, and in Montana of those patients not "dan-
gerously disordered."' 0 3
As forward looking as are the present provisions for temporary observa-
tional commitment,1' 4 it would seem that fullest effectuation of medical con-
siderations in temporary commitment requires yet an additional step. It should
be possible for temporary commitment to be ordered by two statutorily
qualified physicians without resort to the judiciary made necessary under most
of the existing provisions. This could be accomplished by medical certification
with a statutory provision for judicial review at the request of the patient or
some one in his behalf, following his commitment.10 Looking toward e.xpedi-
102. Proceedings should, to the extent possible, be held not in court houses but in
hospitals. When they are held in hospitals, it is a mistake to have the room in the
institution set up as a court room as is now done at Bellevue Hospital. The proceedings
should be informal and conducted in an atmosphere of a medical conference rather than
a court. S'rzcA Commissiox Aipoix'TED By Gov _Nxo DEwEY, Ti CAnE OP 'n
MENTALLY ILL WN THE STATE Or NEv Yomn 95 (1944).
103. Del. Laws 1939, c. 134, § 7; N. Y. ME.NTAL Hyc. LAw § 74; N. C. Gm;-. STAT.
§122-46; TExx. CODE §§ 4443, 4459.1 (Williams, Supp. 1946); Mont. Laws 1943, c. 157,
§§1-3.
104. In the opinion of one who believes commitment of the mentally ill should
be placed entirely in the hands of medical men, temporary commitments are regarded
as "token compromises" which will "deteriorate to the level of meaningless rituals."
Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Philip Q. Roche of Philadelphia,
May 27, 1947. It should be noted that Pennsylvania is one of the few states where
medical certification is sufficient for formal involuntary commitment. And Dr. Roche ad-
mits that the solution to legal formalism in commitment procedures "is a more realistic
facing of the facts that the community must provide more and better doctors and better
treatment." The need for temporary observational commitment is not as dear in those
states where formal involuntary commitment is already handled by physicians, because to
some extent the stigma of an insanity decree may be attributed to its being rendered by
a court.
105. While it would seem on the surface that the stability of the temporary period of
hospitalization would be subject to interruption by demands for judicial review, a
psychiatrist points out that after commitment mentally ill persons-vith the rare ex-
ception of certain paranoiacs-believe they must remain in the hospital and will not
resist proper care and treatment. Interview with Dr. Frederick C. Redlich, Asst. Prof.
of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene, Yale University Medical School. This procedure
is like that used in Maryland and Rhode Island for formal involuntary commitments:
.... well over ninety percent of our patients never appear in Court and the whole
procedure is handled on a medical basis." Communication to the Yale Law Journal
from Dr. George H. Preston, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, Maryland, April 1,
1947. "In practical experience, resort to the courts is not used once in four or five years."
Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Arthur H. Ruggles, Superintendent
of the Butler Hospital, Providence, R. I., April 10, 1947.
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tion of proceedings, this reduction of legal machinery to a minimum is justi-
fied since the function of judicial safeguards relates particularly to protection
against undue deprivation of liberty and gross errors of medical judgment.
-These dangers are at a minimum with the limited statutory period of tempo-
rary commitment. The decision is primarily medical; the more delicate social
considerations arising where long term custodial confinement is involved and
where the judge assumes a greater role are not presented until the question of a
formal involuntary commitment is raised.10 Whatever dangers to the pa-
tient's best interests may arise in a streamlined temporary commitment pro-
ceeding are adequately safeguarded by the provision for statutory review at
the request of the patient or some one on his behalf.
Modernization of Terminology. Another significant recent trend in com-
mitment legislation is the modernization of terminology. While the mere sub-
stitution of the words "mental illness" for "insanity" or "lunacy" would seem
to be desirable, 07 but relatively unimportant, actually serious injury may be
done when "the patient" hears or reads that he has been officially decreed "an
insane person" or "a lunatic" according to the statutory language appearing on
his commitment papers. 08 Modernization of terminology averts this danger.
Words like "commitment" and "parole" are not used in New York because of
their criminal connotations. 10 9 '"Charging the accused with insanity" identifies
mental illness with crime. Principal among public duties to mentally ill per-
sons is legislative reform which will disassociate the process of admitting
patients to mental hospitals from that of committing criminals to public jails.
106. The model commitment law proposed by the National Mental Health Founda-
tion provides for a temporary observational commitment on medical certification and for
a formal involuntary commitment proceeding, where necessary, to be conducted by the
superintendent of the hospital, or his authorized assistant, This novel suggestion repre-
sents an application of administrative adjudication to commitment in order to achieve the
typical advantages of the administrative process--expedition and expert judgment. Sub-
mission by the Yale Law Journal of this plan to about ten mental hospital superintend-
ents resulted, however, in general disapproval mainly because of the increased adminis-
trative burden on hospital staffs already undermanned, because placing the duties of
"prosecutor and judge" on the hospital staff would be subject to public suspect and
criticism, and because the all-important confidence relationships between the patient and
the hospital staff would tend to be injured by issuance of the commitment order from
the very authorities in whom patients are asked to place their trust.
107. Pennsylvania was the first state to substitute "mental illness" for "insanity",
Pa. Acts 1923, No. 414, p. 998. Other states have only recently followed suit: Con-
necticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and
Oregon.
108. See Kerschbaumer, A Patient's Reaction To A "Lunacy" Charge, 101 J. NzRv.
& MENT. DiSEASE 378 (1945) ; Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. Arthur
H. Ruggles, Superintendent of the Butler Hospital, Providence, R. I., April 10, 1947.
109., "Certification" and "convalescent status" are the terms substituted. N. Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW §§ 72-5, 87.
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VOLUNTARY ADMISSION
One procedure provided for in commitment statutes is truly an "admission"
and not a "commitment." Voluntary admission undercuts the whole problem
of commitment by altering its basic condition, involuntariness. Voluntary
admission is not a commitment problem; it is a legal expression of the modem
conception of mental illness, wherein the affliction is recognized as a disease
needing special medical attention, wherein no stigma is attached to it, and
wherein its cure at an incipient stage is encouraged by affording an opportu-
nity for hospitalization involving no more red tape than admission to a gen-
eral hospital.
Provision for voluntary admission gives a person a right to be admitted to a
mental hospital upon his application and its acceptance by the hospital super-
intendent, who must be satisfied that the person will benefit by his hospitaliza-
tion." 0 Normally the patient will have been guided to this step by his family
physician or by a mental health out-patient clinic,"' but a physician's certifi-
cate, however, should be unnecessary, although many states require it. A
voluntary patient becomes subject to all the rules and regulations of the hospi-
tal, but he may leave upon giving advance written notice, the number of days
being specified by the statute. Upon his giving notice, if the hospital au-
thorities believe his detention ought to be continued, they then should have an
opportunity to initiate a formal involuntary commitment proceeding and to
detain him until the decision is made. A disadvantage of the notice provision
is its availability to a voluntary patient upon becoming restless and dissatisfied
shortly after his admission,"- a difficulty solved in New York by making a
patient's admission conditional upon his agreement not to give notice for the
first sixty days." 3 While the first voluntary admission law was passed by
Massachusetts in 1881,14 six states still do not provide for this procedure u 5
and a few statutes are unsatisfactory in limiting voluntary admission to pay-
ing patients."" The lack of hospital facilities, moreover, causes the non-use
110. For a list of requirements which a voluntary admission law should meet, see
Kempf, supra note 7, at 5.
111. See Szmx, op. cit. supra note 9, at 17-22, 33-4.
112. This is especially true in the case of alcoholics, so that voluntary admission for
them is discouraged. Overholser, The Voluntary Admission Law: Certain Legal and
Psychiatric Aspects, 80 Ams. J. PsycnwiA"R 475, 478-9 (1924).
113. N. Y. MIENTAL HYG. LAW § 71.
114. Mass. Laws 1881, c. 272, §§ 3, 4. For an early expression of the need for such
a law, see Smith, Remarks on the Lunacy Laws of the State of New York, 40 Ams. J.
IqsAIrrY 50, 63-4 (1883).
115. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri and North Dakota. See Ap-
pendix, p. 1209 infra. Ten states, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee and Wyoming, have enacted voluntary admis-
sion laws since 1939.
116. S. D. CoDE § 30.0115 (1939) ; TEzxx. Coow § 4459.1 (3) (Villiams, Supp. 1946);
,VAs. Rnv. STAT. § 6954-2 (Remington, 1932). The Washington provision, moreover.
limits the admission for purposes of observation only. For criticism of this, urging the
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of voluntary admission lawys in some states.117
In addition to the patient's mental illness, his mental competence is con-
sidered important in voluntary admissions, for if he is not capable of under-
standing the nature of his acts, the admission cannot be "voluntary." Most
statutes, therefore, contain a provision requiring the superintendent to satisfy
himself that the patient is competent to understand his application.,, It has
been suggested that the act of voluntary admission constitutes a contract be-
tween the patient and the superintendent, which could not bind an incompe-
tent patient.119 The emphasis on legal incompetence is unfortunate, A person
who is a fit subject for mental treatment and who would not object to hospi-
talization should not be denied the easiest method of admission merely because
he may be too indecisive, weak-minded or incompetent to sign his own
papers.120 The contract theory is no obstacle to an incompetent person's ad-
mission where arranged by his legal guardian or close relative. Some such
procedure is provided for in four states,12 1 and in eight additional states a
minor may be admitted on the signature of his parent or guardian. "  In
order to guard against the "railroading of a wealthy uncle," especially in the
inclusion of treatment, see Rickles, supra note 100, at 5. While the Vermont statutory
provision does not limit voluntary admission to paying patients, VT. Pun. LAWS § 4048
(1933), this limitation is reported to be in practice, VT. DFPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WE.L-
FARE, op. cit. supra note 41, at 8. As in the case of a formal involuntary commitment,
a determination of financial responsibility should not precede voluntary admission, but
see, e.g., N. J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-46 (1939).
117. "Although the statutes provide two ameliorative alternatives, namely voluntary
admission and 'commitment for observation' for thirty days before the final adjudica-
tion is made as to 'sanity', neither of these practices is encouraged, chiefly on account
of the over-crowded conditions of the institutions." KANSAS LEGISLATIVE CouNcIL, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 4. See Kempf, supra note 7, at 5 and Overholser, supra note 112,
at 477.
118. E.g., ME. REV. STAT., c. 23, § 116 (1944) ; MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 59, § 40 (1939);
MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 123, § 86 (1942); R. I. GEN. LAWS, c. 71, § 41 (1938).
119. Overholser, supra note 112, at 480-3; Fenning, Voluntary Submission to Treat-
ment and Custody In Hospitals for the Insate, 58 A. M. A. J. 1104, 1105 (1912).
120. In New York this type of patient, often an old person suffering from senile
psychosis or cerebral arteriosclerosis, is committed on the certificate of one physician.
N. Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 73. West Virginia has recently adopted this procedure, the
committing authority being a health officer. H. B. No. 47, Art. 4, § 3-b (Feb. 10, 1947) ;
and Oklahoma's pending revision includes a provision for commitment by two physicians,
S. B. No. 122, §20 (1947). In all three laws a prerequisite is the lack of objection on
the part of the patient, but the commitment is only temporary and must be changed at the
end of the statutory period by resort to certification from the superintendent to the judge.
121. Ark. Acts 1943, No. 241, p. 498, §3; ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 912, §4-1 (Smith-
Hurd, Supp. 1946); OHIO GEN. CODE § 1890-50 (Page, Supp. 1946); UTAH CODS § 85-
7-34 (Supp. 1945).
122. Aaiz. CODE § 8-210 (Supp. 1945); CAL. WELF. & INSTIT. CODE § 6602 (1944);
Del. Laws 1945, c. 219, § 1; MICH. STAT. ANN., c. 127, § 14.809(1) (Supp. 1946) ; Nev.
Laws 1947, c. 257, § 16 (a); N. Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 71; ORE. CoMP. LAWS § 127-214
(Supp. 1943); Wis. STAT. § 51.10 (1945).
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case of admission to a private hospital, it may be desirable to require a medical
certificate where the voluntary patient is "signed in" by some one else.
MIEDIcAL DuE PRocEss
Ideal Setti:g for Commitment. The problem of commitment can only be
seen in its proper perspective when fixed in the overall picture of the treat-
ment of mental disease. To integrate effectively streamlined commitment pro-
cedures into the fight against mental illness requires that they be implemented
with relatively new types of facilities. The full possibilities for early diagno-
sis and cure implicit in streamlined commitment procedures can only be real-
ized when there are provided adequate psychopathic facilities more readily
accessible and better integrated with the community than the conventional
state mental hospital.1 Such a program calls for a vast increase in the num-
ber of small community psychopathic hospitals, psychopathic wards in general
hospitals and mental hygiene clinics.
In a modern integrated community mental health program, state mental
hospitals would treat only the seriously psychotic and those incurable patients
who merely need custodial care. 24 Mentally ill persons needing hospitaliza-
tion for the first time would be admitted to a special psychopathic hospital or
a psychopathic ward of a general hospital. 1-e These facilities would serve as
screening agents for the state mental hospitals and would accept patients by
123. Mental health services were originally limited to hospitalized patients, so that
mental hospitals were isolated from community life. A vivid example of this isolation
is reflected in the following provision of Florida's commitment statute: "Each and every
inmate of each and every insane asylum... shall be allowed to choose one individual
from the outside world, to whom she or he may write .. :' (emphasis added) FLA.
STA . ANN. § 394.13 (1943). Recently considerable effort has been made to bring the
conventional state mental hospitals into closer contact with the nearby communities. See
Wise, The Relation of the Mental Hospital to the Community, 29 ME.;v. Hvo,. 412
(1945) ; Jackson, The Role of a Public Mental Hospital With Refcren-ce To the Men-
tally Ill of a Community in Pub. No. 9 of the Am. Assoc. for the Adv. of Se., MENTAL
HEALTH 331 (1939); Stevenson, Psychiatry in the Conmunity, id. at 335; BnYAZN,
ADmmisTRATm PsYcHIATRY 20-1, 309-28 (1936).
124. See Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. H. K. Petry, Superin-
tendent of Harrisburg State Hospital, Pa., April 21, 1947. Incurable patients who merely
need custodial care would always constitute a heavy burden on state mental hospitals,
unless some other provision were made for them. At present this problem is especially
critical because of the increasing numbers of old patients with senile psychosis and
cerebral arteriosclerosis. See Malzberg, The Expectation of Psychoses uth Cerebral
Arteriosclerosis in New York State, 19 PsYcnIATRic Q. 122 (1945); SrECuv. Conuxs-
sioN ArpoiNTEa By GovmmioR DEVMY, op. cit. supra note 102, at 85-8; Co.:sncrxc-r
ComasrrTE APPoINTED To STuDY STATE HosprrALs, op. cit. supra note 38, at 4.
125. See Parsons, Administrative Practices Dealing With the Admission of Persons
to Hospitals for Mental Diseases in Pub. No. 9 of the Am. Assoc. for the Adv. of Sc.,
MENTAL HEALTH 309 (1939); ILLINois LEsisLATIvE Couzcu, op. cit. supra note 63,
at 13.
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voluntary admission and temporary observational commitment.120 Many pa-
tients would be discharged after a short residence, and those having serious
-psychoses demanding prolonged hospitalization would be transferred to state
mental hospitals by a voluntary procedure, or, if necessary, a formal involun-
tary commitment initiated by the chief medical officer of the psychopathic
hospital or ward.'2 Not only would this system relieve state mental hospitals
of overcrowded conditions and permit their concentration on the more serious
cases of mental illness, but its association of community mental health serv-
ices with general hospitals would minimize a patient's sense of being held in
custody and maximize Iis sense of being medically assisted.1 28 At least one
psychopathic ward or hospital accommodating sixty patients is said to be
needed for each 300,000 of population,'2 but there are only about one hun-
dred existing psychopathic services in the country.
0  I
The furthest outpost of modern mental health services in the community is
the mental hygiene clinic.181 One purpose of the National Mental Health Act
is to implement the establishment of out-patient mental health clinics, where
scientific research, personnel training, public education and preventive work
may be accomplished. Community clinics, moreover, provide the integrating
link in a total mental health program among practicing physicians, general
hospitals, mental hospitals, social welfare agencies, public schools and juvenile
courts. It is estimated that a minimum of 1300 clinics is needed,13 2 but on
126. For a brief statement on the operation of such existing psychopathic facilities,
see Hamilton, Kempf, Scholz and Caswell, supra note 12, at 12.
127. "Except for the-excellent work of diagnosis and segregation done at Bellevue
Hospital the admissions to State hospitals would undoubtedly be higher. In the year
1942, 29,480 persons went through the Psychopathic Division of this hospital, of whom
8,979 were committed to State hospitals." SPECIAL CoMMIssIoN APPoINTED Dy GovERNon
DEwEy., op. cit. supra note 102, at 83, n. 1.
128. ". . . during the next fifty years, with an increasing understanding of the mental
hospital as a curative institution, the majority of patients will seek care in such institu-
tions just as they do in the general hospital and be admitted upon voluntary application,"
RUGGLES, op. cit. mipra note 18, at 82. An example of the different public attitude toward
commitment to a psychopathic facility is illustrated by Mississippi's enactment of a
law creating a Department for Prevention of Insanity, Miss. Laws 1944, c. 279; and
whereby a patient may be admitted on written request by a health officer for an indefi-
nite period of time to the ward of the state hospital for treatment of "neurosyphills
and/or other disease which will eventually lead to insanity."
129. Parsons, supra note 125, at 309.
130. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 1943 247
(1946).
131. See KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, op. cit. mipra note 11, at 7-8; Cotton, The
Scope and Purposes of the State Mental-Hygiene Clinic, 24 MENT. HYo. 177 (19405;
Stevenson, Role of Conmuinity Clinics in Mental Hygiene, 96 A. M. A. J. 997 (1931).
For standards of mental hygiene clinics, see 102 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 267-9 (1945);
BRYAN, op. cit. supra note 123, at 285-308. For pictorial publicity of clinics, see New
Haven Sunday Register Magazine, April 20, 1947, p. 10.
132. Hearing before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
nerce on H. R. 2550, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1945).
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the basis of one clinic for every 100,000 of population, only about twenty per
cent of this goal has been achieved.lm
In addition to relieving the stress in the commitment process, out-patient
clinics and additional community mental health facilities would also serve as
control centers in after-care so that hospital superintendents would be able
quickly to discharge partially recovered patients whose hospitalization is no
longer more beneficial than a proper extramural environment. Thus not only
is the number of commitments to state mental hospitals decreased, but also the
rate of discharges is increased.I3 The psychiatric social workers of com-
munity facilities would help greatly to check on the suitability of the proposed
new environment and provide the necessary follow-up supervision of conva-
lescent patients. 3 5 These facilities would also enable an e-x-pansion of the
foster home care or boarding out programs for harmless patients, not suffi-
ciently recovered to be convalescent, but who would be happier in a private
home where the conditions would be suitable to the individual patient 3 0 The
emphasis in applying public resources to the mental health problem, therefore,
should be on establishment of these new community facilities rather than
mainly on enlargement of conventional state mental hospitals.
But the implementation of such plans for improved mental health condi-
tions depends ultimately on increased appropriations to raise the standards of
public mental care and treatment. 3 7 At the present low level of appropria-
133. Felix, Mental Public Health: A Plan of National Scope, Reprint of Annual
Meeting Address to Mass. Society for Mental Hygiene, Jan. 24, 1946, p. 2 Thirteen
states provide no mental health clinic service whatever. N. Y. Times, April 4, 1947,
p. 26, col. 5.
134. In Indiana it was estimated that if the present system of community mental hy-
giene services were extended to cover the entire State, commitments to state mental hos-
pitals would be redud fifteen to twenty percent, and discharges increased about fifteen
percent, thereby saving the state about 867,892. Vogel, supra note 12, at 1945. But the
increased facilities would pay for themselves only in the long run, because of the con-
sequent increase in the patient load. Russel, supra note 5, at 419.
135. See FRENcH, PsvcHrurnIc SocIAL ,VWo 116-60 (1940); Bry&rM., op. cit. supra
note 123, at 207-39.
136. See Pollock, A Brief History of Family Care of Mental Palients in America,
102 Am. J. PsYcarATRY 351 (1945) ; CRuTcHER, FosTEn Houn CARE roa MENTAL PA-
TIENTS (1944); Osborne, The Use of Family Care As . Treatment Procedure I'itri
the Mentally I1, 27 Miner. HYG. 412 (1943). Before the days of social workers boarding
out programs were criticized because of their placing responsibility back on the super-
intendents of the poor. Channing, Lunacy Legislation it New York., 46 A. J. In-
sArNY 298 (1889). For those states which have made legal provision for family care,
see the chart in Appendix, p. 1209 infra.
137. There is a critical disparity between the standards for psychiatric hospitals
established by the American Psychiatric Association, 102 Au. J. Psycaxmnv 264-6
(1945), and the existing national average standards, Hamilton, Kempf, Scholz and
Caswell, supra note 12, at 84-90: e.g., The A. P. A. standard ratio of medical personnel
to patients in mental hospitals is 1:150, while the national average is about 1:230.
While medical understaffing in state mental hospitals may be somewhat accounted for by
the fact that there are only 4000 psychiatrists among the 189,000 physicians in the United
1947] 1205
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions consequent inadequate treatment facilities retard discharges, causing
overcrowdedness, which in itself is a practical argument against simplification
of admission.13 3 Public awareness, moreover, of unsatisfactory living condi-
tions intensifies mistrust of mental hospitals and suppression of mental ill-
ness. 13 9 Reforms in commitment procedures may be empty legislative gestures
without appropriations expressive of increased public responsibility.
Administrative Responsibility. A necessary corollary to the drive for re-
duction of legal safeguards in commitment is a correspondingly increased ad-
ministrative vigilance over patients' welfare in mental hospitals after they
have been committed. The type of administrative agency now made use of by
states to control and manage their mental hospitals varies widely. 140 In only a
few states is there a centralized, independent agency devoted solely to mental
health administration.' 4 ' But this field of public responsibility is so large and the
problems involved are so critical that it would seem advisable, especially in the
more populous states, to have a separate mental health department, headed by
States, the National Committee for Mental Hygiene significantly reports that of 900
-psychiatrists interviewed on their return from the armed forces, only sixty chose to
take jobs in state hospitals. Pub. Admin. Clearing House, Release No. 2, March 11,
1947. Principal among the reasons for psychiatrists' reluctance to go to state mental
hospitals is the low rate of pay: e.g., the starting rate in Connecticut, one of the wealth-
iest states, is $2,820-$3,780 as compared with $4,169.60-$4,902.00 for a similar position
in the Veterans Administration. CommTrrrEE APPOINTED TO STUDY STATE HOSPITALS, Op.
cit. s pra note 38, at 10. Low salaries cause personnel shortages and employment of
incompetent personnel in all of the hospital departments: e.g., Attendants in Connecti-
cut's mental hospitals receive $23-$27 per week take-home pay for a 48 hour week. CONN.
STATE Hosp. EmPLOYEES, LOCAL 398 A. F. S. C. M. E., PAMPHLET No. 2 2 (1947).
Furthermore there is a critical disparity among the states and regions of the United
States in standards of psychiatric hospital care. See Zubin and Scholz, Regional Dif-
ferences in the Hospitalization and Care of Patients With Mental Diseases in Pun,
HEALTH REP. Supp. No. 159 (1940); THE NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH FOUNDATION,
WHERE DOES YOUR STATE STAND? (1946). Appropriations for 1947 in many states in-
dicate, however, that public apathy may be ending. Pub. Admin. Clearing House Releases,
March 10-12, 1947; but see N. Y. Times, April 28, 1947, p. 22, col. 6 and May 19, 1947,
p. 20, col. 6; and p. 24, col. 1.
138. "[There has been] no attempt to liberalize the procedure to make hospital admis-
sion easier, as at the present time we are overcrowded and have many persons committed
awaiting admission." Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dr. David A. Young,
General Superintendent of Mental Hygiene, North Carolina State Hospitals Board of Con-
trol, April, 1947. Only nine states reported to be not overcrowded in 1938. Hamilton, Iempf,
Scholz and Caswell, supra note 12, at 22.
1 139. Public consciousness can be awakened by accounts of these conditions, as pre-
sented by Maisel, Bedlam 1946, LIFE (May 6, 1946) p. 102, but public confidence must also
be encouraged by giving wide publicity to the progressive therapy and institutional practices
of the better hospitals, as presented by Deutsch, PM, June 18, 1946, pp. 12-3 and June 21,
1946, p. 15.
140. See Overholser, supra note 42, at 520-1.
141. MAss. ANN. LAWs, c. 19, § 2 (1942); Mich. Acts 1945, No. 271, p. 426; N. Y.
STATE DFPARTMENTS LAW §§ 360-71; and a bill for a separate Department of Mental
Health is pending in Pennsylvania, H. B. 1062 (1947).
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a physician with long experience in administrative psychiatry.142 Nor should
public responsibility end at state hospitals; officially unsupervised private hos-
pitals should not be allowed to function. 143 Yet only seventeen states now re-
quire licensing and inspection of private mental homes and hospitals. 4"
Despite centralized administrative supervision, however, the primary adminis-
trative responsibility for the patients' welfare belongs to the superintendent.
He also should be a physician with experience in administrative psychiatry,
whose appointment to state hospitals should not depend on political considera-
tions and who should be removable only for good cause.145
Statutory safeguards of patients' medical and civil rights are essential ele-
ments of a commitment statute.140 These should include: (1) the right to
private visitation and correspondence with an agent of the department, the
patient's attorney, physician, minister, relatives or friends ;14T (2) the right to
employment at a useful occupation depending on his condition and available
facilities; (3) the right to periodic complete examinations reported to the
cognizant state department ;14s (4) the right to have the use upon him of any
mechanical restraints reported to the cognizant state department;140 (5) the
right to be discharged as soon as medically advisable; (6) the right of those
patients not really incompetent to enjoy their legal prerogatives ;1 0 and (7) the
right of all patients to a writ of habeas corpus. Because the patient is not in a
position effectively to assert these rights, his practical enjoyment of them
depends primarily on alert and progressive administration at the hospital and
state levels.
SUMMARY
Mental illness has always taken a heavy toll of human resources. Ignorance
as to its nature has frequently caused man's treatment of it to result in more
142. Noyes, Purposes, Aitms, Powers and Duics of a CcnItralicd Staic Administratie
Orgainivation in Pub. No. 9 of Am. Assoc. for the Adv. of Sc., m;-.Ar.L HMALTH 291,
292 (1939).
143. Parsons, supra note 125, at 311-2.
144. For a list of states licensing private mental institutions, see the chart in Ap-
pendix, p. 1209 infra. Virginia is the latest state to have passed such a licensing law, S. B.
No. 27 (1947).
145. See Russel, Measures Governing the Qialifications for Appointinent, Training
and Tenure of Those Employed ih the Public Care of the Mcnitally Ill in Pub. No. 9 of
the Am. Assoc. for the Adv. of Sc., MALrr,. HALTHr 302 (1939).
146. A mental patient's bill of rights covering most of these enumerated rights is
included in the commitment.statutes of Louisiana, LA. GENi. STAT. § 3938A6 (Dart, Supp.
1947) and Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, § 171 (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
147. Some form of guaranteed private visitation and correspondence is common to
the commitment statutes of all states.
148. This right is suggested by the model commitment law of the National Mental
Health Foundation, and while it may be objectionable as prescribing a medical routine
in a mental hospital, its enforcement would seem to do no harm and to prevent a mental
patient from being overlooked in one of the less thoroughly administered hospitals.
149. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 76-1223 (1935) ; MNASs. ANN. LAws, c. 123, §§ 35-S (1942l.
150. See pp. 1188-90 supra.
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harm than good. Legislation has reflected this ignorance, especially in com-
mitment statutes which have been overbalanced with unnecessary procedures
designed to protect the public safety, the public pocketbook and the individual
right to unrestrained freedom. Psychiatrists, however, have been able to
demonstrate the evils in this excessively legal procedure for a long time, but
not until recently have legislatures generally begun to revise commitment stat-
utes. The principal change has been the introduction of temporary observa-
tional admissions and the continued expansion of voluntary admissions to
facilitate psychiatry's attempt to treat incipient mental illness. Commitment
of mental patients, like public control of venereal disease, is now primarily a
problem in public education,
In working toward a change in public attitude from "committed like a
criminal" to "admitted like a patient", the formal court procedure should be
minimized. Prime authority in initial stages of commitment should be dele-
gated to the physician; only where the patient's observational residence has
revealed the necessity for prolonged custodial hospitalization should the judge
assume more than a monitory role. Eventually with public education follow-
ing closely behind advancing psychiatric knowledge, establishment of com-
munity mental health facilities, development of centralized state mental health
administrations, and introduction of federal aid, the maximum potential of
the nation may be brought to bear in the fight against mental illness.
[Vol, 56: 11781208'
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APPENDIX
FoPaAL INVOLUNTARY Com *rTrmEzx
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Alabama x N
Arizona x x N
Arkansas x x x
California x x x x x x
Colorado x x x
Connecticut x x x X x




Illinois x x x
Indiana x x
Iowa x x
Kansas x x x x x
Kentucky x x x x x
Louisiana x x x x x x
Maine x x x x
Maryland x x x x X
Massachusetts x x x x x N x
Michigan x x x x x x x
Minnesota x x x
Mississippi x
Missouri x x x
Montana x N N N
Nebraska x x
Nevada x x
New Hampshire x x
New Jersey x x x x x
New Mexico x x x x
New York x x x x x X
North Carolina x x x x X
North Dakota x
Ohio x x x x
Oklahoma x N x
Oregon x x N
Pennsylvania x x xx x
Rhode Island x x x x x
South Carolina x x x
South Dakota x x x
Tennessee x x x x
Texas x x x x
Utah x x x x x
Vermont x x x x
Virginia x x x x x x
Washington x x x x
West Virginia Nx X x
Wisconsin x x x x x
Wyoming x x x x x x
